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Abstract
For NASA's air transportation research program, we demonstrate an approach to
integrating reliability, performance, and operational procedure modeling into a
system safety analysis. Our methodology is distinguished by its ability to merge
system design/functionality information with the dynamic parameterization of a
system's situation to generate accident statistics and measures of reliable system
operation. In addition, this approach can be employed to perform sensitivity
analyses to identify weak points in the system's operation and design.
Our approach to system safety analysis results from the integration of a Reliability
model and an Interaction-Response model. The Interaction-Response model pro-
vides information regarding the frequency of encounters and the predicted out-
come of those encounters as a function of the system's alerting system and ability
to resolve encounters. The Reliability model provides, as a function of time, prob-
abilities associated with the critical systems' availability and failure states. Scaling
the conditional operational safety metrics provided by the Interaction-Response
Model by the system state probabilities produced by the Reliability model creates
the system-level safety statistics.
Products of this analysis include
# predicted incident (encounter) statistics;
# predicted accident statistics; and
# predicted false alarm statistics, as well as system availability and reliabil-
ity.
As an application of this methodology, we have considered the problem of simul-
taneous independent approaches of two aircraft on parallel runways (independent
approaches on parallel runways). An illustration of how our approach can be ap-
plied for system sensitivity analysis is also given.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
PROBLEM DEFINITION
The continuing growth of air traffic will place demands on NASA' s Air Traffic
Management (ATM) system that cannot be accommodated without the creation of
significant delays and economic impacts. To deal with this situation, work has be-
gun to develop new approaches to providing a safe and economical air transporta-
tion infrastructure. Many of these emerging air transport technologies will
represent radically new approaches to ATM, both for ground and air operations.
The essential questions that must be answered before adopting a new approach to
air transport management are as follows:
Is the new system safe?
What are the costs of implementing the new system?
What are the direct economic benefits of the new system with respect to
reduced delays or reduced airline costs?
# What are the indirect economic benefits of the new system with respect to
deferred construction of new airports?
What is the optimal transitioning process from the current system to the
new system to ensure safety?
To answer these questions and thus select a viable ATM concept, analysis will
contain
# performance models to measure delays, throughput, and aircraft density;
* safety models to measure aircraft interactions and predict accident statis-
tics; and
# economic models to measure system costs and associated benefits.
As shown in Figure 1-1, each of these three classes of analysis models rely on the
others for some of their inputs. In other words, the design, analysis, and evaluation
of Air Traffic Management concepts must be treated as an interactive process in
which the analyses provide crucial feedback to system developers, as well as the
benefits and safety metrics required to support program advocacy.
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Figure 1-1. Integrated System Analysis and Development
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Thus, the primary focus in developing a methodology for integrated system analy-
sis must be to understand and model the interactions among performance models,
safety models, and economic models. By doing so, the methodology can be used
to
• identify the drivers or weak links in the current system;
• provide guidance in selecting topics for improvement studies;
measure net improvement in a proposed concept, distinguishing candidate
concepts that represent global gains from those that solve one problem by
creating another; and
• provide a foundation for cost/benefit analyses that can measure true sys-
tem-wide impacts.
Products of this analysis include
• predicted incident (encounter) statistics;
• predicted accident statistics; and
• predicted false alarm statistics, as well as system availability and reliabil-
ity.
As an application of this methodology, we have considered the problem of simul-
taneous independent approaches of two aircraft on parallel runways (independent
approaches on parallel runways [IAPR]).
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INTEGRATED SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS: CONCEPT,
APPROACH, AND PRODUCTS
We develop and demonstrate an integrated safety analysis methodology, one of
the key elements of an integrated system analysis capability. This methodology is
distinguished by its ability to merge system design/functionality information with
the dynamic parameterization of a system's situation to measure accident statistics
and reliable system operation. The "system" may include both air and ground sub-
systems within this analysis framework. In addition, it can perform sensitivity
analyses to identify weak points in the system's operation and design. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 1-2.
Figure 1-2. Integrated Safety and Reliability Modeling and Evaluation
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On the left side of Figure 1-2 are the steps leading from requirements derived for
an operational concept to the development of a Reliability Model of the system
architecture, which has been proposed to meet those requirements. This represents
a traditional reliability/safety modeling process. On the fight are the models re-
quired to capture the environment in which the system is to operate, as well as the
interaction of those environmental models with response models representing the
execution of the rules and procedures that have been developed for the candidate
concept. This represents a modeling process for the dynamic analysis of the sys-
tem' s situation.
1-3
Our approach to system safety analysis results from the integration of the Reli-
ability Model and the Interaction-Response Model. The Interaction-Response
Model provides information regarding the frequency of encounters and the pre-
dicted outcome of those encounters as a function of the system's alerting system
and ability to resolve encounters. The Reliability Model provides, as a function of
time, probabilities associated with the critical systems' availability and failure
states. Scaling the operations safety metrics from the Interaction-Response Model
by the system state probabilities from the Reliability Model creates the system-
level safety statistics. This process is illustrated in Figure 1-3.
Figure 1-3. Combining Model Outputs
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Products of this analysis include
• predicted accident statistics,
• predicted false alarm statistics, and
• predicted system availability and reliability.
Moreover, as the operational concept evolves, the impact of changes in system
architecture, rules and procedures, and operational scenarios can be easily re-
evaluated with this methodology.
Figure 1-2 makes it clear that system safety is being addressed from a variety of
perspectives, each of which affects safety. These include
• system functionality, the analysis of how reliably the system components
perform;
• rules and procedures, the analysis of how the system is designed to re-
spond in both safe and unsafe situations; and
• operational scenario, the analysis of the environment in which the system
is expected to operate.
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Integrating models that quantify each one of these three elements creates an analy-
sis capability that is now system-wide and responsive to ongoing changes in the
definition and requirements of the operational concept.
APPLICATION TO INDEPENDENT APPROACHES ON
PARALLEL RUNWAYS
As an application of this methodology, we have considered the problem of simul-
taneous, but independent approaches of two aircraft on parallel runways (i.e.,
IAPR). In visual meteorological conditions (VMC), the pilots may accept respon-
sibility for maintaining separation between their aircraft by visual means. For ap-
proaches conducted during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), air traffic
control personnel are responsible for the separation between the aircraft. The Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) allows independent parallel approaches to be
carried out in VMC with a runway separation minimum of 700 feet. In IMC, inde-
pendent approaches may be conducted to runways spaced at least 4,300 feet apart.
This minimum is reduced to 3,400 feet if the airport is equipped with the Preci-
sion Runway Monitor (PRM) system.
A study performed by the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group has predicted sig-
nificant increases in runway capacity per hour if dependent approaches could be
replaced by independent approaches. Because of capacity increases to be gained, it
is desirable to reduce the minimum runway separation required for independent
approaches.
A variety of projects have been undertaken within the past several years to explore
alerting systems and cockpit displays for the parallel approach situation. Aircraft
are more closely spaced during parallel approach than during any other phase of
flight. The potential exists for an aircraft on either runway to deviate off course
toward another aircraft on the parallel runway. To increase safety, an alerting sys-
tem is used to warn flight crews of these blundering aircraft. The goal of the
alerting system is to ensure adequate separation between aircraft while allowing
parallel approaches to be carded out safely. With reference to our integrated safety
model in Figure 1-2, these studies represent Interaction-Response Models.
Independent Approaches on Parallel Runways Concept
and Operational Procedures
Figure 1-4 illustrates the elements of a typical IAPR concept.
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Figure 1-4. Parallel Runway Concept
The IAPR system takes advantage of advances that have been made in communi-
cation, navigation, and surveillance technologies. Primary among these is GPS-
based navigation and digital communications for both surveillance and pilot in-
formation exchanges (ADS-B). GPS-based navigation, with appropriate augmen-
tation when needed, will provide much more accurate aircraft position and
velocity information, reducing the need for large protective bubbles around air-
craft. The accuracy and speed of the ADS-B surveillance data link system is also
key to successful implementation of the IAPR concept.
The assumed operational procedure for the IAPR addressed here is as follows:
• On-board GPS system provides accurate, timely positional information of
own ship.
• Position of own ship is broadcast via ADS-B.
• Positions of other ships are received and processed via ADS-B.
Location of own ship relative to runway approach and other ships is proc-
essed and displayed on a cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI)
monitor.
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• Alerting logic sounds alert according to levels of "encounter" criteria an-
ticipated.
• Avoidance maneuver is initiated in order to avoid "near collision" event.
Lacking any involvement of ground control, the IAPR concept just described rep-
resents a severe and possibly worst-case scenario. It is, however, more manage-
able from a modeling standpoint for this first application. Certainly, future work
must include models for ground control interaction with aircraft.
Independent Approaches on Parallel Runways Analysis
Framework Overview
Figure 1-5 illustrates the IAPR analysis framework organized with respect to four
major components: system Reliability Model, Impact Model, Interaction-
Response Model, and derivation of system safety statistics.
Reliability
Model
RNP
navigation
j SurveilmnceI
I A--'., I
I Gu_,n-- I
Figure 1-5. IAPR Analysis Framework
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Note: RNP = required navigational performance.
Compared to Figures 1-2 and 1-3, the new feature in Figure 1-5 is the "Impact
Model." The function of the Impact Model is to associate each system functional
state employed in the Reliability Model with an operational capability of the air-
craft and pilot. For example, a fully operational aircraft can execute a normal ap-
proach. The system functional state,fully operational, is associated with the flight
capability, normal approach. Furthermore, the likelihood of the system functional
state,fully operational, is quantified by the Reliability Model, while (conditional)
safety metrics for the normal approach are determined from the Interaction-
Response Model through a simulation process. The interaction-response simula-
tion model includes a specific example of the alerting logic currently under inves-
tigation by NASA. The resulting system-level safety statistics are calculated by
scaling the conditional safety metrics with the likelihood of the system functional
state as illustrated in Figure 1-3.
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An in-depthexaminationof eachanalysiscomponentis presentedin Chapter3.
Thefinal resultsaresummarizedherein Tables1-1and 1-2.
Table 1-1. Combined Results at 1, 700-Foot Runway Spacing
System safety statistic (t) = _ Pr(simulation safety stat.I flight track) x Pr (flight track)(t)
Flight tracks
Flight tracks
[norm_145, norm_145
[norm_145, fake_145]
[norm_145, oadj_145]
[norm_145, sb5_145]
[norm 145, sh5_145]
[norm 145, slo 145]
[norm 145, b115 145]
[norm_145, bl30_145]
Conditional simulation mlfety statistic=
Rel. of). Collisions False alarms
1 0 0
.9544 0 .0456
.9125 0 .0875
.996 0 .0040
.9854 .0092 .0054
.9872 ,0091 .0037
.996 .0018 .00,72
.9872 .0037 .0091
Prol_bllity flight trk
t = 4hrs. t = 10 hrs
9.99e-1 9.98e-1
3.65e-6 9.1 e-6
3.65e-6 9.1 e-6
1.72e-4 4.3e-.4
1.72e..4 ; 4,31_
i
1.72e-4 4.3e-4
i
7.15e-6 1.8e-5
7.15e-6 1.80e-5
_ ufety _at=t/c=
Rel. op. (4) = 0.9995
Collisions (4) = 3.19E-6
False alarms (4) = 2.82E-6
Rel. op. (10) = 0.9993
Collisions (10) = 7.97E-6
False alarms (10) = 7.05E-6
The Reliability Model was evaluated for both 4 and 10 hours of flight prior to the
aircraft beginning the runway approach. System safety statistics are computed for
each time period and reflect the fact that as the time in flight increases prior to
runway approach, the overall hazard increases and reliable operation decreases.
In addition to the 1,700-foot spacing, we completed a baseline evaluation at both
2,500-foot and 3,400-foot runway spacing. The three sets of safety statistics are
given in Table 1-2.
Table 1-2. Safety Statistics at 1,700-Foot, 2,500-Foot, and 3,400-Foot
Runway Spacings
1,700-foot spacing 2,500-foot spacing
Ral. op. (4) = 0.999531
Collisions (4) = 3.187E-6
False alarms (4) = 2.819E-6
Ral. op. (10) = 0.999329
Collisions (10) = 7.968E-6
Fals_ alarms (10) = 7,047E-6
R=,I. op. (4) = 0.999524
Collisions (4) = 3.160E-6
False alarms (4) = 1.017E-6
Rel. op. (10) = 0.999310
Collisions (10) = 7.901E-6
False alarms (10) = 2.544E-6
3,400-foot spacing
Rel. op. (4) = 0.999535
Collisions (4) = 7.179E-7
False alarms (4) = 1.013E-6
Rel. op. (10) = 0.999339
Collisions (10) = 1.796E-6
False alarms (10) = 2.533E-6
As the runway spacing changes, only the conditional safety statistics change in
response; the scaling probabilities from the Markov model remain the same. The
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actual numerical values should be considered hypothetical and devised for the
purposes of this example; nevertheless, the trend of the data is reasonable and
what one would expect. As the time in flight increases prior to runway approach,
the overall hazard increases and reliable operation decreases. As the runway
spacing between aircraft increases, the probabilities of collision and false alarm
decrease while reliable operation increases.
In order to demonstrate the approach, we have employed simple models. How-
ever, the approach is one wherein models can be appropriately tailored for the
level of detail available or desired.
We conclude with an example of sensitivity analysis to show how this safety
methodology can be used to suggest and evaluate design changes leading to im-
proved system performance.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: AN EXAMPLE
The results of the integrated safety analysis can be used to determine how sensi-
tive the safety statistics are to features of the system architecture, rules, and oper-
ating procedures, or operational scenarios and environment. By understanding
these sensitivities, design improvements can be proposed and evaluated with a
cost/benefit tradeoff analysis. But the first step is to isolate the sensitivity.
Referring back to Table 1-1, Combined Results at 1, 700-Foot Runway Spacing,
observe that the slow heading change blunders of 5 and 10 degrees have the high-
est collision probabilities: 0.0092, and 0.0091, respectively. In addition, these
tracks have the largest probabilities of occurrence with a value of 1.72E-4 at
4 hours and 4.3E-04 at 10 hours. In our example, these two tracks are associated,
in part, with a degraded navigation capability such as a faulty INS subsystem.
Suppose it were possible to acquire a new, upgraded Inertial Navigation System
(INS) component with a failure rate reduced from 1E-04 down to 1E-05. Replac-
ing the "old" INS component by the new, an improved element would result in
reduced probabilities of occurrence for the slow 5 and 10 degree heading blun-
ders, namely, 5.3E-5 at 4 hours and 1.32E-4 at 10 hours.
Reevaluating the system statistics now yields improvements in collision and false
alarm probabilities as shown in Table 1-3.
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Table 1-3. Comparison of Results for Improved INS
Original INS Improved INS
Collisions (4) = 3.19E-06
False alarms (4) = 2.82E-06
Collisions (10) = 7.97E-06
False alarms (10) = 7.05E-06
Collisions (4) = 1.01 E-06
False alarms (4) = 1.02E-06
Collisions (10) = 2.515E-06
False alarms (10) = 2.54E-06
Note:Numbersinparenthesesdenote lengthof flight inhours.
Alternatively, a rules and procedures change could be made whereby independent
parallel landings would be precluded when the aircraft is in the degraded naviga-
tion state. Costs and benefits would have to be evaluated for both the architecture
option and rules/procedures option to arrive at the best course of action to im-
prove the overall system performance and reduce the liability of accident and false
alarm. In either case, the integrated safety analysis can be exercised interactively
and iteratively to arrive at the best solution.
SUMMARY
We have demonstrated an approach to integrating reliability, performance, and
operational procedures modeling into a system safety analysis. Our methodology
is distinguished by its ability to merge system design/functionality information
with the dynamic parameterization of a system's situation in order to measure ac-
cident statistics and reliable system operation. In addition, it can perform sensitiv-
ity analyses to identify weak points in the system's operation and design.
Our approach to system safety analysis results from the integration of the Reli-
ability Model and the Interaction-Response Model. The Interaction-Response
Model provides information regarding the frequency of encounters and the pre-
dicted outcome of those encounters as a function of the system' s alerting system
and ability to resolve encounters. The Reliability Model provides, as a function of
time, probabilities associated with the critical systems' availability and failure
states. Scaling the operations safety metrics from the Interaction-Response Model
by the system state probabilities from the Reliability Model creates the system-
level safety statistics. Products of this analysis include
# predicted incident (encounter) statistics;
# predicted accident statistics; and
# predicted false alarm statistics, as well as system availability and reliabil-
ity.
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Chapter 2
Integrated Safety Analysis Overview
_i _ i i i } ::::
CONCEPT, APPROACH, AND PRODUCTS
In this report, we develop and demonstrate an integrated safety analysis method-
ology, one of the key elements of an integrated system analysis capability. This
methodology is distinguished by its ability to merge system design/functionality
information with the dynamic parameterization of a system's situation in order to
measure accident statistics and reliable system operation. The "system" may in-
clude both air and ground subsystems within this analysis framework. In addition,
it can perform sensitivity analyses to identify weak points in the system's opera-
tion and design. This is illustrated in Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-1. Integrated Safety and Reliability Modeling and Evaluation
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On the left side of Figure 2-1 are the steps leading from requirements derived for
an operational concept to the development of a reliability model of the system ar-
chitecture, which has been proposed to meet those requirements. This represents a
traditional reliability/safety modeling process. On the right are the models re-
quired to capture the environment in which the system is to operate, as well as the
interaction of those environmental models with response models representing the
execution of the rules/procedures that have been developed for the candidate con-
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cept.Thisrepresentsamodelingprocessfor thedynamicanalysisof thesystem's
situation.
Ourapproachto systemsafetyanalysisresultsfrom theintegration of the Reli-
ability Model and the Interaction-Response Model. The Interaction-Response
Model provides information regarding the frequency of encounters and the pre-
dicted outcome of those encounters as a function of the system' s alerting system
and ability to resolve encounters. The Reliability Model provides, as a function of
time, probabilities associated with the critical systems' availability and failure
states. Scaling the operations safety metrics from the Interaction-Response Model
by the system-state probabilities from the Reliability Model creates the system-
level safety statistics. This process is illustrated in Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-2. Combining Model Outputs
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Products of this analysis include predicted accident statistics, predicted false alarm
statistics, and predicted system availability and reliability. Moreover, as the op-
erational concept evolves, the impact of changes in system architecture, rules and
procedures, and operational scenarios can be easily accounted for with this meth-
odology.
From Figure 2-1, it is clear that system safety is being addressed from a variety of
perspectives, each of which impacts safety. These perspectives include (1) system
functionality, the analysis of how reliably the system components perform;
(2) rules and procedures, the analysis of how the system is designed to respond in
both safe and unsafe situations; and (3) operational scenario, the analysis of the
environment in which the system is expected to operate. Integrating models that
quantify each one of these three elements create an analysis capability that is now
system wide and responsive to ongoing changes in the definition and requirements
of the operational concept.
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APPLICATION TO INDEPENDENT APPROACHES
ON PARALLEL RUNWAYS
As an application of this methodology, we have considered the problem of simul-
taneous, but independent approaches of two aircraft on parallel runways. In VMC,
pilots may accept responsibility for maintaining separation between their aircraft
by visual means. For approaches conducted during IMC, air traffic control per-
sonnel are responsible for the separation between the aircraft [1]. The FAA allows
independent parallel approaches to be carried out in VMC with a runway separa-
tion minimum of 700 feet. In IMC, independent approaches may be conducted to
runways spaced at least 4,300 feet apart. This minimum is reduced to 3,400 feet if
the airport is equipped with the PRM system [2].
A study performed by the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group has predicted sig-
nificant increases in runway capacity per hour if dependent approaches could be
replaced by independent approaches [3]. Because of capacity increases to be
gained, it is desirable to reduce the minimum runway separation required for in-
dependent approaches.
A variety of projects have been undertaken within the past several years to explore
alerting systems and cockpit displays for the parallel approach situation
[4,5,6,7,8]. Aircraft are more closely spaced during parallel approach than during
any other phase of flight. The potential exists for an aircraft on either runway to
deviate off course toward another aircraft on the parallel runway. To increase
safety, an alerting system is used to warn flight crews of these blundering aircraft.
The goal of the alerting system is to ensure adequate separation between aircraft
while allowing parallel approaches to be carded out. With reference to our inte-
grated safety model in Figure 2-1, these studies represent Interaction-Response
Models.
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Independent Approaches on Parallel Runways Concept
and Operational Procedures
Figure 2-3 illustrates the components of a typical IAPR concept.
Figure 2-3. Parallel Runway Concepts
The IAPR system takes advantage of advances that have been made in communi-
cation, navigation, and surveillance technologies. Primary among these is GPS-
based navigation and digital communications for both surveillance and pilot in-
formation exchanges (ADS-B). GPS-based navigation, with appropriate augmen-
tation when needed, will provide much more accurate aircraft position and
velocity information, reducing the need for large protective bubbles around air-
craft. The accuracy and speed of the ADS-B surveillance data link system is also
key to successful implementation of the IAPR concept.
The assumed operational procedure for IAPR is this:
On-board GPS system provides accurate, timely positional information of
own ship.
Position of own ship is broadcast via ADS-B.
Positions of other ships are received and processed via ADS-B.
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• Location of own ship relative to runway approach and other ships is proc-
essed and displayed on CDTI monitor.
• Alerting logic sounds alert according to levels of "encounter" criteria an-
ticipated.
• Avoidance maneuver is initiated to avoid "near collision" event.
Lacking any involvement of ground control, the IAPR concept just described rep-
resents a severe and possibly "worst-case" scenario. It is, however, more manage-
able from a modeling standpoint for this first application. Certainly, future work
must include models for ground control interaction with aircraft.
Independent Approaches and Parallel Runways Analysis
Framework Overview
Figure 2-4 illustrates the IAPR analysis framework organized with respect to four
major components: System Reliability Model, Impact Model, Interaction-
Response Model, and Derivation of system safety statistics.
Figure 2-4. IAPR Analysis Framework
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Compared with Figures 2-1 and 2-2, the new feature in Figure 2-4 is the Impact
Model. The function of the Impact Model is to associate a given system functional
state from the reliability model with an operational capability of the aircraft and
pilot. For example, a fully operational aircraft can execute a normal approach.
The system functional state, fuUy operational, is associated with the flight capa-
bility, normal approach. Furthermore, the likelihood of the system functional
state,fully operational, is quantified by the Reliability Model, while (conditional)
safety metrics for the normal approach are determined from the Interaction-
Response Model through a simulation process. The resulting system-level safety
2-5
statistics are calculated by scaling the conditional safety metrics with the likeli-
hood of the system functional state as illustrated in Figure 2-2.
An in-depth examination of each of the four analysis components is presented in
Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Independent Approaches on Parallel Runways
Safety Analysis
RELIABILITY MODEL
Role of the Reliability Model
The objective of the Reliability Model is to predict the state of the aircraft capa-
bilities at the start of and during an independent approach. In general, when an
aircraft lines up for an independent approach, it will have been inflight for several
hours. Assuming that the aircraft had no failures prior to takeoff, in the time from
takeoff until the start of the approach, failures of components within the systems
of the aircraft may have occurred that have reduced its capabilities. The reduced
capabilities, possibly undetected by the pilot, can affect the performance of the
aircraft during the approach and result in the aircraft drifting or blundering into
the path of an aircraft approaching the adjacent runway. Alternately, the compo-
nent failures during en route flight may prevent an independent approach from
taking place. Procedural rules may prohibit the pilot from attempting an inde-
pendent approach if there is a known loss of a specific aircraft capability or, in the
worst case, failures could have caused the loss of the aircraft. The Reliability
Model will calculate the probabilities of the reduced capabilities that impact the
safety of the aircraft when an independent approach is attempted.
Functional Elements
The first step in developing the Reliability Model needed for the IAPR system
safety model is to define the aircraft functions that directly and uniquely impact
the inputs of the Interaction-Response Model. The functions, or capabilities, of the
aircraft used in the IAPR system safety model are defined in Table 3-1. These
functions were developed by reviewing the current status of the development of
the Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing (AILS) research [6,7] and other re-
lated documentation [9,10]. However, the function definitions and the system de-
scription of the IAPR system that is presented in the next subsection are not
strictly based on the AILS research. The function definitions and the system de-
scription represent the capabilities and components, respectively, that are likely to
comprise an IAPR system, since a specification of an AILS system does not yet
exist.
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Table 3-1. IAPR System Functional Elements
Function Definition
IAPR RNP navigation The capability to perform conformance monitoring of an air-
craft's performance and adherence to its approach path
(RNP).
ADS-B/surveillance data The capability of an aircraft to broadcast, receive, and proc-
link ess ADS-B information for situational awareness, conflict
avoidance, and airspace management.
Collision-alerting avionics The capability of an aircraft to predict a probable collision
with another aircraft during approach and landing and to pro-
vide timely and reliable alerts so that the pilot can avoid the
collision (this includes alerting logic, processing, and display
monitors).
Guidance and control The aggregate of all other aircraft capabilities and support
subsystems exclusive of the previous three functions (e.g.,
propulsion, flight control, and engine control).
Pilot The capability of the pilot(s) to safely operate the aircraft.
The function definitions are limited to the capabilities of a single aircraft. The
IAPR system is an aircraft-based collision-avoidance system, but there may be
dependencies on systems external to the aircraft that can affect safety. The de-
pendencies with the aircraft that may be approaching the adjacent runway will be
accounted for because the same function definitions are applied to the adjacent
aircraft. The dependencies on systems exclusive of the two aircraft are not in-
cluded in the Reliability Model. These would include any monitoring and interac-
tion from the ground controller or interaction with other aircraft in the airport
area.
The functions defined in Table 3-1 are the capabilities of the aircraft required for
an independent approach. The first three functions represent capabilities that need
to be added to present commercial aircraft to support IAPR. The fourth function,
guidance and control, represents all the capabilities and systems of the aircraft,
exclusive of those required for the first three functions, which can affect safety of
an independent approach. The fifth function isolates the capability the pilot (and
crew) provides in the safe operation of the aircraft.
System Description
The system description that follows defines the reliability characteristics of the
IAPR system. That is, the system description that will be presented defines the
individual components that can fail, how they are interconnected, the redundancy
of the components and subsystem functions, and the redundancy management
logic.
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To demonstrate the safety analysis methodology, a low-fidelity description of a
plausible IAPR system is created. A design for the IAPR system does not exist
now. So, a system is created providing the functionality expected for an IAPR
system [6, 7] and includes some degree of fault tolerance. The system description
constructed is complex enough to demonstrate the application of the safety analy-
sis methodology, but simple enough so minimal resources would be needed to de-
velop the Reliability Model. The low-fidelity model does not limit the approach.
Each system component in the system description is assigned to only one function
to maintain the independence of the functions. The advantage of maintaining the
independence of the functions is that it enables the probability of any system state
to be computed in a simple and direct manner. For example, the probability of the
system being fully operational, at some time t, is simply the product of the prob-
abilities of each of the functions being in their fully operational states at time t.
Figures 3-1 through 3-4 present the block diagrams for the system description.
These are discussed in the next subsections. However, to comprehend the block
diagrams, several conventions need to be defined.
4, Components shown with broken lines are assigned to another function.
They are included in the block diagrams of some of the functions to indi-
cate the interconnection between the components of different functions
and are not considered one of the components necessary for the function.
4 Duplicate blocks indicate dual-redundant components. Dual-redundant
components are both on-line if functional, but only one is necessary for the
function to be fully operational.
4 The connections between components shown should be understood to in-
dicate that the connected components are fully cross-strapped. For exam-
ple, in Figure 3-1 the connection between the navigation processors and
the navigation displays indicated by the arrow means each of the two navi-
gation processors is connected to each of the navigation displays.
IAPR-RNP SYSTEM
Figure 3-1 presents the block diagram of the IAPR RNP system. The six compo-
nents shown with solid lines provide the IAPR RNP function defined in Ta-
ble 3-1. The Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and INS provide the
sensed position of the aircraft. The GPS receiver provides discrete position up-
dates at fixed intervals in time. The INS data are integrated with the position up-
dates from the GPS receiver to provide a more frequent position update than can
be obtained with the GPS receiver alone. The data fusion and the navigation com-
putation are done in the navigation processor. The navigation displays provide
flight crews with navigation information and with alerts when navigation con-
talnment is violated.
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Figure 3-1. IAPR RNP
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Table 3-2 presents the operational states of the IAPR RNP Navigation functions
that are pertinent to the IAPR safety model. The IAPR RNP Navigation system is
fully operational if both the GPS receiver and the INS 1 navigation processor and
1 navigation displays are functional. The system is degraded if either the GPS or
INS has failed, the failures are detected and compensated for, and an indication
has been given to the pilot by the system. The failed-safe state is the state of the
system when component failures have caused the loss of the IAPR RNP naviga-
tion function and an indication is provided to the pilot to indicate this capability
no longer is available. Alternately, the failed-uncovered state represents the loss of
the function, but an indication is not provided to the pilot to indicate the loss of
this capability.
Table 3-2. IAPR RNP Navigation Operational States
State Definition Impact
Fully operational TSE (total system error) is less Navigation capability available for
than containment limit and no normal approach; ideal distributions
alert of loss of RNP capability
Degraded Loss of either GPS or INS result- Navigation capability available for
ing in a degraded navigation ca- normal approach; nonideal
pability distributions
Failed safe Alert of loss of RNP capability No longer able to perform independ-
ent approaches; approach aborted
Failed uncovered TSE is greater than containment Invalid self-knowledge and
limit and no alert of loss of RNP broadcast of navigation data
capability
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ADS-B/SURVEILLANCE DATA LINK
Figure 3-2 shows the block diagram of the ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link system.
The ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link system transmits the IAPR state variable data
for the aircraft (which the aircraft performing an independent approach on the ad-
jacent runway can monitor) and receives the IAPR state variable data from the
adjacent aircraft. The IAPR state variable data broadcast from the aircraft enables
the Collision-Alerting Avionics of other aircraft to predict a collision. Conversely,
the IAPR state variable data the aircraft receives from other aircraft enables it to
predict a collision with these aircraft. The Attitude Heading Reference System
(AHRS), GPS receiver, and INS provide the sensor data that make up the IAPR
state variable data. However, these three sensors provide redundant information,
and sufficient data are available if two of the three are functional. (Note that the
GPS receiver and the INS are not included in the ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link
function, having already been included in the IAPR RNP navigation function.)
Figure 3-2. ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link
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Table 3-3 presents the operational states of the ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link
function. For the ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link function to be fully operational,
one ABS-B processor, one ABS-B display, the modulator and transmitter, the re-
ceiver and demodulator, and the antenna must be functional. The degraded, failed-
safe, and failed-uncovered states are defined in Table 3-3.
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Table 3-3. ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link Operational States
State Definition Impact
Fullyoperational Valid broadcast and reception of Transmit and receive functions
broadcasts from other aircraft are fully available
Degraded
Failed safe
Unable to receive broadcasts
from other aircraft and may or
may not receive alert of capabil-
ity loss; broadcast capability
functioning
Invalid broadcast and alert of
capability loss and, possibly
also, loss of reception capability
of broadcasts from other aircraft
Knowledge of other aircraft is in-
valid but approach is allowed
No longer able to perform inde-
pendent approaches; approach
aborted
Failed uncovered Invalid broadcast and no alert of Other aircraft do not receive valid
capability loss surveillance data
COLLISION-ALERTING AVIONICS
The Collision-Alerting Avionics block diagram and operational states are shown
in Figure 3-3 and Table 3-4, respectively. The Collision-Alerting Avionics is fully
operational if one alerting processor and one alerting displays are functional. The
alerting processor receives the position of its own aircraft from the IAPR RNP
navigation system and the IAPR state variable data from the aircraft approaching
on the adjacent runway from the ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link system.
Figure 3-3. Collision-Alerting Avionics
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Table 3-4. Collision-Alerting Avionics Operational States
State Definition Impact
Fully operational Collision-alerting capability func- Alerting capability available for
tioning properly normal approach
Failed safe Collision alerting not available No longer able to perform inde-
and alert of capability loss pendent approaches; approach
aborted
Failed uncovered Collision alerting not available Unable to detect blunders of other
and no alert of capability loss aircraft but approach is not aborted
GUIDANCE AND CONTROL AND PILOT
Figure 3-4 shows the block diagram of the Guidance and Control and Pilot sys-
tems. The pilot and crew are included here as the block denoted "Pilot." The
Guidance and Control system simply represents all the systems of the aircraft ex-
clusive of the IAPR RNP navigation, ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link, and Colli-
sion-Alerting Avionics, which impact safety. The pilot provides inputs to engine
and flight control to ultimately direct the thrust and flight path of the aircraft. Pro-
pulsion is provided via the engines. Engine control is provided by the engine
processor using input from the pilot and engine sensors. Flight control is through
the control processor, which moves the control surfaces based on inputs from the
pilots and aircraft state and environment sensors. The alternator and power distri-
bution units (PDUs) generate and distribute electrical power to all components
requiring it.
Figure 3-4. Guidance and Control and Pilot Systems
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Table 3-5 presents the operational states of the guidance and control function. The
guidance and control system is fully operational if one engine sensors, one aircraft
state and environmental sensors, one engine processor, one control processor, one
guidance and control displays, both engines, one control surfaces, and one alter-
nator and PDU are functional. The failed-safe state would result from the covered
failure of one engine. Any uncovered failures or covered failures that result in the
system not satisfying the definition of fully operational would place the guidance
and control function in the failed-uncovered state.
Table 3-5. Guidance and Control Operational States
State Definition Impact
Fully operational All other capabilities and support Capability is fully available for nor-
subsystems operational mal approach
Failed safe Loss of sufficient capability and No longer able to perform inde-
knowledge of loss pendent approaches; approach
aborted
Failed-uncovered Loss of sufficient capability and Worst-case blunder
no knowledge of loss or inability
to control aircraft
Table 3-6 presents the operational states of the pilot function. The pilot function is
meant to capture the effect of human error in the safety of an independent ap-
proach. While an actual model of the reliability of the human in the control of the
aircraft is beyond the level of work being presented here, the pilot function can
still be broken down into operational states to demonstrate how the reliability of
the human is integrated in the safety analysis methodology.
Table 3-6. Pilot Operational States
State Definition Impact
Fully operational Pilot functioning nominally with- Alerting capability available for
out any faults normal approach
Recoverable fault Pilot fault has occurred; is possi- No impact prior to approach; air-
ble to recover from fault craft blunder after start of approach
Nonrecoverable Pilot fault has occurred; is not No impact priorto approach; air-
fault possible to recover from fault craft blunder after start of approach
Models
A set of Markov Reliability Models are constructed from the system described in
the System Description subsection. The Markov models are developed in accor-
dance with the techniques presented in Reliability Modeling Methodology for
IAPR Safety Analysis [ 11]. A separate model is constructed for each function de-
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fined in Table 3-1. The input files specifying each Markov model to the Semi-
Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator (SURE) Reliability Analysis Program [12]
are included in Appendix A. The input files completely specify the Markov Reli-
ability Models.
Appendix A also includes Table A-1, which provides the mapping from the nu-
merical states of each Markov model to the operational states for each function
defined in the Tables 3-2 through 3-6, respectively. Each state of each Markov
model is part of one, and only one, of the operational states of one function. Note
that in Table A-1, the operation state "Unknown" is added for the
ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link and guidance and control functions. This state re-
suits from applying a modeling technique referred to as Model Truncation to re-
duce the number of states in these Markov models [11 ].
Results and Discussion
The Markov Reliability Models in the last subsection are used to calculate the
probabilities of being in the operational states of each of the functions. Table 3-7
presents the baseline failure rates and coverage probabilities for each of the com-
ponents identified in the system description for the IAPR system. The failure rates
and coverage probabilities constitute nearly all the input parameters for the mod-
els. The only missing input parameter is recovery rate from an intermittent human
failure for the pilot model. The baseline value for this rate is set at 3.6 * 10 2 re-
coveries per hour.
The input parameters used are not from any specific source and are selected with
the intent to highlight the fidelity of the Markov Reliability Models. Typical val-
ues of failure rates and coverage probabilities are assigned for the components
that are likely to comprise the system. The failure and recovery rates for the Pilot
model are not based on any empirical data.
Table 3-8 shows the calculated probabilities for the operational states of each
function. The Markov models are evaluated using version 7.9.8 of the SURE Re-
liability Analysis Program developed by NASA Langley Research Center [12].
The Markov model state probabilities are calculated for 4 and 10 hours. These
represent two time intervals from aircraft takeoff to the lineup point for an inde-
pendent approach.
Note that the results in Table 3-8 are presented as bounds on the probabilities of
being in the states of each function. The bounds occur from two sources. The first
source, which affects all of the models, is that the SURE program calculates and
outputs the bounds of the probability of being in the states of the model
(numerical approximation error). The second source, which affects just the
ADS-B/Surveillance Data Link and guidance and control Markov models, is the
model truncation aggregation technique used to limit the size of these models.
Model truncation introduces some uncertainty into the predictions [11].
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Table 3-7. Baseline Failure Rates and Coverage Probabilities
i i
Component ] Failure Rate (failures/hour) I Coverage Probability
m m
IAPR RNP Navigation
GPS 3.0E-5 0.99
INS 1.0E-4 0.99
Navigation displays 2.0E-5 0.999, 0.99
Navigation processor 1.0E-5 0.99, 0.95
ADS-B/surveillance data link
AHRS
ADS-B displays
ADS-B processor
Modulator and transmitter
Receiver and demodulator
Antenna
1.0E-5
2.0E-5
1.0E-5
5.0E-5
5.0E-5
1.0E-6
0.99
0.999, 0.99
0.99, 0.95
0.99
0.99
1.00
Collision-alerting logic
Alerting displays 2.0E-5 0.999, 0.99
Alerting processor 1.0E-5 0.99, 0.95
Guidance and control
Engine sensors
Engine processor
Engine
Alternator and PDU
Guidance and control displays
State and environment sensors
Control processor
Control surfaces
4.0E-5
1.0E-5
1.0E-5
2.0E-5
2.0E-5
4.0E-5
1.0E-5
5.0E-6
0.99
0.99
0.999
0.99
0.999
0.99
0.99
0.99
Pilot
Intermittent human failure 1.0E-4 1.00
Permanent human failure 1.0E-6 1.00
Note: For coverage probabilities entered as two numbers, the first number is the coverage
probability of first failure in redundant components, and the second number is for second failure in
the redundant components.
The probabilities shown in Table 3-8 are used by the Impact Model discussed in
the following section. However, there are some system probabilities produced by
the Markov Reliability Models that are also of interest. Some component failures
occurring before the approach lineup can preclude an independent approach. Ta-
ble 3-9 presents two metrics of interest. The f'n'st is the probability that insufficient
capability is available to attempt an independent approach and the approach is
aborted by the pilot. This is the probability that one or more of the functions, ex-
cluding the pilot function, is in its failed-safe operational state. The second metric
is the probability of a loss of the aircraft before the approach lineup. This is the
probability of being in the failed-uncovered operational state of the guidance and
control function.
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Table 3-8. Probabilities of Operational States
Operational state
Probability of being operational state
At 4 hours At 10 hours
Lower Upper
bound bound
Lower Upper
bound bound
IAPR RNP navigation
Fully operational
Degraded
Failed safe
Failed uncovered
9.9948E-1
5.15E-4
5.49E-8
6.16E-6
9.9948E-1
5.15E-4
5.49E-8
6.16E-6
9.9870E-1
1.29E-3
3.43E-7
1.54E-5
9.9870E-1
1.29E-3
3.43E-7
1.54E-5
ADS-B/surveillance data link
Fully operational
Degraded
Failed safe
Failed uncovered
9.9959E-1
2.00E-4
2.02E-4
2.96E-6
9.9960E-1
2.00E-4
2.02E-4
2.96E-6
9.9899E-1
5.00E-4
5.05E-4
7.40E-6
9.9899E-1
5.00E-4
5.05E-4
7.41E-6
Collision-alerting logic
Fully operational 1.0000E+0 1.0000E+0 1.0000E+0 1.0000E+0
Failed safe 7.83E-9 7.83E-9 4.90E-8 4.90E-8
Failed uncovered 9.60E-7 9.60E-7 2.40E-6 2.40E-6
Guidance and control
Fully operational
Failed safe
Failed uncovered
9.9991E-1
7.99E-5
1.03E-5
9.9991E-1
8.00E-5
1.03E-5
9.9977E-1
2.00E-4
2.60E-5
9.9978E-1
2.00E-4
2.61E-5
Pilot
Fully operational
Recoverable failure
Nonrecoverable failure
1.0000E+0
2.78E-7
4.00E-6
1.0000E+0
3.59E-7
4.00E-6
9.9999E-1
2.78E-7
1.00E-5
9.9999E-1
7.83E-7
1.00E-5
Table 3-9. Probabilities of Operational States
Metric
Insufficient capability
independent approach
Loss of aircraft before
approach lineup
Probability
Upper bound at 4 hours
2.82E-4
1.03E-5
Upper bound at 10 hours
7.06E-4
2.61E-5
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IMPACT MODEL
From the description of the system Reliability Model given in the previous sec-
tion, it is useful to think of aircraft and pilot as an integration of five functions;
IAPR RNP navigation, ADS-B/surveillance data link, collision-alerting logic,
guidance and control, and pilot. Each function is further characterized by its states
of health or degradation, namely, fully operational, degraded, failed safe, or failed
uncovered. Each possible system state is associated with an impact that represents
a potential reduction in system capabilities. The critical question is addressed
next.
How System States Impacts Manifest Themselves During the
Runway Approach
The correct answer to this question is complex and requires careful study, data
analysis, and compilation of information from many expert sources. We have not
undertaken such an investigation within the scope of this initial task. However, to
illustrate the safety methodology, we assigned different flight tracks for runway
approaches as the impact of system functional states. In doing so, we can achieve
an association between the system functional state probabilities of the Markov
model and the operational safety metrics generated from the Interaction-Response
Model. The specific details of the Impact Model presented in this illustration
should not be taken as conf'Lrmed, validated facts; they are not! However, the ob-
jective of the Impact Model, which is to determine and choose a flight track for
runway approach that reflects a combined operational capability of the aircraft and
pilot that is consistent with a given system functional state, remains valid and im-
portant to the realistic evaluation of system safety.
Flight Tracks for Runway Approaches
The flight tracks used in our Impact Model come from a set of eight piloted flight
track templates developed by Rockwell-Collins using a Fokker 70 flight simulator
[6]. These tracks have been widely used as the set of intruder trajectories for
testing alerting systems [4,5,6,7,8]. A brief description of each is given in Ta-
ble 3-10.
Each track is recorded for three different speeds, 130, 145, 160 knots, and under
both low- and high-turbulence conditions [6,7,8].
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Table 3-10. Flight Tracks for Runway Approaches
Normal approach/landing Aircraft heading is aligned to runway heading
Aircraft begins runway approach with 30 ° head-
Blunder of 30° ing turned away from own runway and toward
other runway
Aircraft begins runway approach with 15° head-
Blunder of 15° ing turned away from own runway and toward
other runway
Slow heading change blunder of 10° Aircraft begins runway approach and slowly de-
viates from own runway toward other runway by
10° heading change
Slow heading change blunder of 5° Aircraft begins runway approach and slowly de-
viates from own runway toward other runway by
5° heading change
Constant bank angle blunder of 5° Aircraft begins runway approach with 5° bank
angle deviation
Fake blunder Aircraft turns toward other ship's runway fol-
lowed by return to desired approach path with
less than 1,000 feet of lateral deviation
Overadjust blunder Aircraft drifts off course away from own and
other's runway, recognizes error, makes an ad-
justment to return to own flight path, and over-
shoots toward other ship's runway with less than
1,000 feet of lateral deviation
For the Interaction-Response Model used in this study, these flight tracks are
stored as data files in which a stream of data parameters6position, heading, bank
angle, and speed6is read every 0.4 seconds. Enhancements to the Interaction-
Response Model are being made to enable users to adaptively change the flight
track in response to system functional states or other "real-time" situations. These
enhancements are discussed in Appendix B.
Impact Model
The objective of the Impact Model is to choose a flight track that reflects a com-
bined operational capability of the aircraft and the pilot that is consistent with a
given system functional state. For example,
a fully operational aircraft can execute a normal approach;
t undetected or transient failures could result in unintentional drifting of the
aircraft from a normal approach, such as the fake or overadjust tracks;
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• degradednavigationalcapabilitycouldresultin low-levelor slow blun-
dering such as 5 or 10 degree changes; or
• significant failure of guidance or control capability or significant pilot er-
ror may result in pronounced blunder behavior of 15 or 30 degree changes.
The Impact Model mapping used in this application is given in Figure 3-5.
Figure 3-5. Impact Model
Flight track
norm Normal approach/landing
Fake: Aircraft fakes blunder
toward other ships runway
Oadj: Aircraft drifts away from o_
and other's runway, then
overadjusts
sl_: Constant 5° bank angle
blunder
shS: Slow 5° heading
change blunder
Slo:Slow 10° heading
change blunder
Markov model
aubvectors Probability It t = 4 hours Probability at t = 10 hours
IN1 ,~$3,A1 ,G1 ,P1] 9.9918e-1 9.9796e-1
|N4,-S3,A1 ,G1 ,P1 ];
n[N1 ,-S3,A3,G1 ,PI];
[N1 ,~$3,A1 ,G'I ,P2]
[N2,~S3,A1 ,G1 ,P1 ];
IN1 ,~S3,A1 ,G1 ,P2]
3.65e-6
1.72e-4
9.1e-6
4.3e-4
Markov model
Flight track subvectora Probability It t = 4 hours Probability at t = 10 hours
b115:15 ° heading blunder 7.15e-6
bl3O: 30* heading blunder
[N1, ~S3,A1 ,G3,P1];
IN1 I-S3 A1 _G1 fP3]
[N1 ,-$3,A1 ,G3,P1 ];
[N1,-$3,A1 ,G1 *P3];
7.15e-6
1.80e-5
1.80e-5
The notation N1, A1, G1, and P1 refer to the fully operational state of the naviga-
tion, alerting, guidance and control, and pilot functions, respectively. The notation
-$3 means any surveillance state except $3. Likewise, N4 is the failed-uncovered
navigational state while A3 is the failed-uncovered state for the alerting avionics
function. State N2 is the degraded navigational state while P2 corresponds to
"recoverable" pilot error. States G3 and P3 are significant error states in the guid-
ance and control and pilot submodels, respectively.
Notice that the "aircraft" is being modeled as a vector of the five functional com-
ponents. Once this association is defined, the Markov model supplies the prob-
abilities of the vector components. In this illustration, the resulting probability is
the product of the component probabilities. However, Markov analysis and mod-
eling is not constrained to "independent" decomposition. Under conditions where
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it wouldbeimportantto modelandevaluatefunctionaldependencies,theanalysis
methodcanaccommodatethattypeof complexity.
We haveevaluatedthemodelfor two time periods,4hoursinto flight and10
hoursinto flight. Thesetimeperiodswerechosensolelyfor illustrativepurposes.
In fact,any timeperiodmaybeevaluatedusingtheMarkovanalysisaswell asthe
two aircraftbeingevaluatedat differenttimeperiodsto simulateanindependent
but simultaneousapproachof two aircrafthavingbeenin flight for differenttime
periods.
Thefact thatMarkovanalysiscanprovidetime-taggedprobabilitiesof theaircraft
systemstatemakesit asuperiorchoicefor usein systemsafetyanalysis.
INTERACTION-RESPONSE MODEL
Background
The Interaction-Response Model used in this study was developed at Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (MIT) under the direction of Professor James
Kuchar, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics during 1995-1996 [5,8].
Draper Laboratory, Inc. obtained this model in January 1997 to expand its capa-
bilities for both the IAPR safety analysis as well as other interesting considera-
tions. Further details of these enhancements can be found in Appendix B.
The original objectives of MITs project were to develop a model of parallel ap-
proach scenarios incorporating parameters such as runway configuration, blunder
characteristics, human response delays, and type and accuracy of information
available to the alerting system; to develop and evaluate a basis for alerting logic
(i.e., time to impact or range); and to evaluate alerting thresholds based on a toler-
able rate of false alarms.
The performance of the prototype alerting system is evaluated using different ap-
proach trajectories developed from piloted flight simulation tests at Rockwell-
Collins [6]. These flight tracks were described above. They include normal ap-
proaches and 6 categories of blunder trajectories: a slow constant-rate turn at a 5 °
bank angle; heading changes of 5°, 10 °, 15°, 30°; and two cases in which the in-
truder began a blunder but returned to its approach path before crossing the threat-
ened aircraft's approach path. Separate trajectory data were available for calm and
turbulent conditions and at airspeeds of 130, 145, and 160 knots. The same tra-
jectories are used at three runways spacings (1,700, 2,500, and 3,400 feet) and
over a series of initial longitudinal spacings (within ±1.5 nautical miles of the
threatened aircraft) to cover a range of possible encounter situations. A total of
42,822 simulations using 39 different types of trajectories can be performed for
the evaluations.
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In theMIT evaluations,thethreatenedaircraft,theevader,alwaysfollows anor-
malapproachpathwhile the intruderfollows oneof theblunderor normalap-
proachpathsfrom thesimulationtests.Thealertinglogic is implementedonly on
theevader.If analertis issued,theevaderperformsthespecifiedclimbing-turn
avoidancemaneuver.Theoutcomeof eachapproachis recorded,including(1)
whetheranalertis generated,(2)whetheracollisionoccurs,and(3) whetheran
alert is deemednecessary.Sixmutuallyexclusivecategorieslistedin Table3-11
areusedto definethepossibleoutcomes.A collision is definedto occurif separa-
tion at anypoint in theapproachwaslessthan500feet.An alert isconsideredto
benecessaryif acollisionwouldhaveoccurredwithout analert.Thus,for exam-
ple,analertin a situationin whichseparationwouldhavebeen501feetwithout
thealert iscategorizedasunnecessary.Suchadefinitionof unnecessaryalert,
thoughstrict, is requiredasaspecificperformancemetric.A pilot's orcontroller's
impressionof "unnecessary"is important,but it is moresubjectiveanddifficult to
useanalytically.
Table 3-11. Outcome Categories
Outcome category Alert issued? Collision occurred? Alert necessary?
Correct rejection No No No
Missed detection No Yes Yes
Unnecessary alert Yes No No
Induced collision Yes Yes No
Correct detection Yes No Yes
Late alert Yes Yes Yes
From Table 3-11, one can see that if an alert is not issued at any time during a run,
it is classified as either a "correct rejection" (if a collision did not occur) or as a
"missed detection" (if a collision did occur). If an alert is issued, the outcome is
placed in one of four categories. An "unnecessary alert" is a case where the in-
truder is not on a collision course; an alert is issued anyway, and a collision is still
avoided. If a collision occurs because of the alert, it is classified as an "induced
collision." A "correct detection" occurs when a collision is averted because of an
alert. Finally, a "late alert" is a case in which an alert is issued, but it is too late to
prevent a collision.
In summary, the Interaction-Response Model is a simulation tool providing sig-
nificant flexibility and timeliness in evaluating very difficult aircraft dynamic be-
havior and alerting response in encounter situations. It is not meant to replace
human in the loop (HITL) evaluations. Indeed, elements of the pilot model in-
cluding response times and the nature and probability of pilot errors and blunders
are all best developed from data extracted from HITL evaluations. Thus, the
simulation approach described here goes hand-in-hand with HITL evaluations.
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Interaction-Response Model Conditional Safety Statistics
The outcome categories of Table 3-11 can be combined to yield three safety sta-
tistics defined as follows:
Probability of reliable operation # Correct re]. + # Correct det.
Total # of runs
[Eq. 3-1]
Probability of collision = # Mis. det. + # Ind. col. + # Late alerts
Total # of runs
[Eq. 3-2]
Probability of false alarm # Unnecessary alerts
Total # of runs
[Eq. 3-3]
These three statistics are generated from the Interaction Response model for each
pair of flight tracks, and they are conditional safety statistics given the flight track
simulated. To remove this conditioning, we multiply by the probability of flying
the approach with this flight track, namely, the Markov probability of the flight
track acquired from the Impact Model. A numerical example is given in the fol-
lowing baseline performance.
BASELINE PERFORMANCE
Table 3-12 shows the results of evaluating the three safety probabilities from the
simulation outcome categories.
Table 3-12. Conditional Safety Statistics
Flight tracks Probability of Probability Probability of
[own ship, other ship] reliable operation of collision false alarm
[norm_145, norm_154]
[norm_145,
[norm_145,
[norm_145,
[norm_145,
[norm_145,
[norm_145,
[norm_145,
fake_145]
oadj_145]
sb5_145]
sh5_145]
slo_145]
bl15_145]
bl30_145]
1.0000
0.9544
0.9125
0.9960
0.9854
0.9872
0.9960
0.9872
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0092
0.0091
0.0018
0.0037
0.0000
0.0456
0.0875
0.0040
0.0054
0.0037
0.0022
0.0091
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In this evaluation, eight pairs of flight tracks were evaluated by both the MIT and
Draper Interaction-Response Models at the 1,700-foot runway spacing. A total of
183 runs were made for each pair of tracks, and the simulation outcomes were
nearly identical for both models.
In each case, the ownship was flying the normal approach at 145 knots. The
alerting logic used in this baseline evaluation was supplied by NASAs Langely
Research Center. It is a time-/range-based threshold logic. The criterion that in-
vokes an evasive maneuver on the part of ownship is that the othership be pre-
dicted to come within 500 feet of ownship within 11 seconds. The pilot response
time was set at 2 seconds; the evasive maneuver was a 25 g pull-up to 2,000 feet
per minute (fpm) climb, with a 5 degree roll rate to a 30 degree bank angle, and a
final heading of 45 degrees. The longitudinal initial condition spacing was incre-
mented at 100-foot intervals thereby producing the 183 runs for each pair of flight
tracks.
COMBINING MODEL OUTPUTS: SYSTEM-LEVEL
STATISTICS
Combined Results
We now complete the baseline performance example by multiplying the condi-
tional safety statistics by the probability of flying the approach with a given flight
track. This probability is obtained from the Markov model. We have evaluated the
Markov model at both 4 and 10 hours of flight time prior to beginning the runway
approach. This information is shown in Table 3-13.
Table 3-13. Combined Results at 1,700-Foot Runway Spacing
System safety statistic(t) = _, Pr(Simulation safety stat.I flight track) x Pr(flight track)(t)
Flighttracks
Flight tracks
[norm_145, nonnn 145
[norm_145, fake_145]
[norm 145, oadj_145]
[norm_145, sb5 145]
[norm 145, sh5_145]
[norm_145, slo_145]
[norm 145, b115_145
[norm_145, b130 145]
Condltlotlal simulation safety statistics
Rel. op. Collisions False alarms
1 0 0
.9544 0 .0456
.9125 0 .0875
.996 0 .0040
.9854 .0092 .0054
.9872 ,0091 .0037
.996 .0018 .0022
.9572 .0037 .0091
Probability flight trk
T:4hrs. t=10hrs
9.99E-1 9.98E-1
3.65E-6 9.1E-6
3.65E-6 9.1E-6
1.72E-4 4.3E-4
1.72E-4 4.3E-4
7.15E-6 1.8E-5
7.15E-6 1.80E-5
is nem = u= ct
Ret. op. (4) = 0.9995
Collisions (4) = 3.19E-6
False alarms (4) = 2.82E-6
Rel. op. (10) = 0.9993
Collisions (10) = 7.97E-6
False alarms (10) = 7.05E-6
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In addition to the 1,700-foot spacing, we completed a baseline evaluation at both
2,500-foot and 3,400-foot runway spacing. The three sets of safety statistics are
given in Table 3-14.
Table 3-14. Safety Statistics at 1,700-Foot, 2,500-Foot, and 3,400-Foot
Runway Spacings
1,700-foot spacing
ty.=ti,ti=,
Rel. op. (4) = 0.999531
Collisions (4) = 3.187E-6
False alarms (4) = 2.819E-6
Rel. op. (10) = 0.999329
Collisions (10) = 7.968E-6
False alarms (10) = 7.047E-6
2,500-foot spacing
System _ffety statistics
Rel. op. (4) = 0.999524
Collisions (4) = 3.160E-6
False alarms (4) = 1.017E-6
Rel. op. (10) = 0.999310
Collisions (10) = 7.901E-6
False alarms (10) = 2.544E-6
3,400-foot spacing
System safety statistics
Rel. op. (4) = 0.999535
Collisions (4) = 7.179E-7
False alarms (4) = 1.013E-6
Rel. op. (10) = 0.999339
Collisions (10) = 1.796E-6
False alarms (10) = 2.533E-6
Sensitivity
As runway spacing changes, only the conditional safety statistics change in re-
sponse; the scaling probabilities from the Markov model remain the same. Al-
though the actual numerical values should be considered "artificial" and devised
for the purposes of this example, the trend of the data is reasonable and what one
would expect. As the time in flight increases prior to runway approach, the overall
hazard increases and reliable operation decreases. As the runway spacing between
aircraft increases, the probabilities of collision and false alarm decrease while re-
liable operation increases.
In order to demonstrate the approach, we have employed simple models. How-
ever, the approach is one wherein models can be appropriately tailored for the
level of detail available or desired.
We conclude this chapter with an example of sensitivity analysis to show how this
safety methodology can be used to suggest and evaluate design changes leading to
improved system performance.
Analysis: An Example
The results of the integrated safety analysis can be used to determine how sensi-
tive the safety statistics are to features of the system architecture, rule and operat-
ing procedures, or operational scenarios and environment. By understanding these
sensitivities, design improvements can be proposed and evaluated with a cost/
benefit tradeoff analysis. But the first step is to isolate the sensitivity.
3-19
Referringbackto Table3-13,observethattheslowheadingchangeblundersof 5
and10degreeshavethehighestcollision probabilities,0.0092and0.0091,re-
spectively.In addition,thesetrackshavethelargestprobabilitiesof occurrence
with avalueof 1.72E-04at 4 hoursand4.3E-04at 10hours.Tracingbackto the
ImpactModelandtheReliabilityModel, we find thatthedegradednavigation
state,N2, is themajorcontributorto theseprobabilitiesof occurrence.
Supposeit werepossibleto acquireanew,upgradedINS componentwith are-
ducedfailureratefrom 1E-04downto 1E-05.Replacingthe"old" INS component
with thenew improvedelementwould resultin reducedprobabilitiesof occur-
rencefor theslow 5 and10degreeheadingblunders,namely,5.3E-05at 4 hours
and1.32E-04at 10hours.
Reevaluatingthesystemstatisticsnow yieldsthefollowing improvementsin col-
lision andfalsealarmprobabilitiesshownin Table3-15.
Table 3-15. Comparison of Results for Improved INS
Original INS Improved INS
Collisions (4) = 3.19E-06 Collisions (4) = 1.01E-06
False alarms (4) = 2.82E-06 False alarms (4) = 1.02E-06
Collisions (10) = 7.97E-06 Collisions (10) = 2.515E-06
False alarms (10) = 7.05E-06 False alarms (10) = 2.54E-06
Alternatively, a rules and procedures change could be made whereby independent
parallel landings would be precluded when the aircraft is in the degraded naviga-
tion state, N2. Costs and benefits would have to be evaluated for both the archi-
tecture option and rules/procedures option to arrive at the best course of action to
take to improve the overall system performance and reduce the liability of acci-
dent and false alarm. In either case, the integrated safety analysis can be exercised
interactively and iteratively in order to arrive at the best solution.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT RESULTS
We have demonstrated an approach to integrating reliability, performance, and
operational procedures modeling into a system safety analysis. Our methodology
is distinguished by its ability to merge system design/functionality information
with the dynamic parameterization of a system' s situation in order to measure ac-
cident statistics and reliable system operation. In addition, it can perform sensitiv-
ity analyses to identify weak points in the system's operation and design.
Our approach to system safety analysis results from the integration of the Reli-
ability Model and the Interaction-Response Model. The Interaction-Response
Model provides information regarding the frequency of encounters and the pre-
dicted outcome of those encounters as a function of the system' s alerting system
and ability to resolve encounters. The Reliability Model provides, as a function of
time, probabilities associated with the critical systems' availability and failure
states. Scaling the operations safety metrics from the Interaction-Response Model
by the system-state probabilities from the Reliability Model creates system-level
safety statistics.
Products of this analysis include (1) predicted incident (encounter) statistics;
(2) predicted accident statistics; and (3) predicted false alarm statistics, as well as
system availability and reliability.
As an application of this methodology, we have considered the problem of simul-
taneous, but independent approaches of two aircraft on parallel runways
(independent approaches on parallel runways, or IAPR).
A variety of projects have been undertaken within the past several years to explore
alerting systems and cockpit displays for the parallel approach situation. Aircraft
are more closely spaced during parallel approach than during any other phase of
flight. The potential exists for an aircraft on either runway to deviate off course
toward another aircraft on the parallel runway. To increase safety, an alerting sys-
tem is used to warn flight crews of these blundering aircraft. The goal of the
alerting system is to ensure adequate separation between aircraft while allowing
parallel approaches to be carried out. With reference to our integrated safety
model, these studies represent interaction-response models.
The major limitation of statistical information generated exclusively from an In-
teraction Response model is that it represents conditional safety statistics given
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theflight tracksimulated.To removethisconditioning,we haveshownhow to
applytheprobabilityof flying theapproachwith this flight trackusingMarkov
analysisto computethisprobability.Theresultsgive system-levelsafetystatistics
thatcanbeusedto answerimportantquestionssuchasthevariationof reliable
operation,accidents,andfalsealarmsasafunctionof differentrunwayspacings.
Theresultsof the integratedsafetyanalysiscanbeusedto determine how the
safety statistics are sensitive to features of the system architecture, rule and oper-
ating procedures, or operational scenarios and environment. By understanding
these sensitivities, design improvements can be proposed and evaluated with a
cost/benefit tradeoff analysis.
AREAS FOR FUTURE WORK
In order to demonstrate the integrated safety analysis methodology, we have em-
ployed simple models. We believe the approach is one wherein models can be ap-
propriately tailored for the level of detail either available or desired. Here are
several areas of future work in which greater model resolution is desired to more
accurately predict the safety of the air transport concept.
Pilot Behavior
The issue of how often a pilot chooses to ignore or override alerting system
warnings or ground control instructions is certainly important to the safety as-
sessment of any air transport concept. These elements of the pilot model as well as
other information relating to response times and the nature and probability of pilot
errors and blunders are all best developed from data extracted from HITL evalua-
tions and must continue to be incorporated in the simulation model.
Ground Controller Behavior and Interaction
Realistically speaking, there is no emerging air transport concept that will be fully
implemented without progressing through scheduled participation with current
day ground control. Certainly, future work must include models for ground con-
trol interaction with aircraft.
Environmental Phenomena
The two-aircraft assumption in our model is certainly a simplification that must be
removed. Other aircraft in the near vicinity of two aircraft on parallel runways will
make the issue of evasive maneuvers and resulting "go-arounds" a major consid-
eration for overall safety. In addition, the forces of wake vortex and environmental
and structural obstacles must be included to account for safe approaches as well as
safe evasive maneuvers.
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Conclusions
Improved Modeling of the Impact of System Failures and/or Pilot
Errors on Flight Trajectory
This issue will require careful study, data analysis, and compilation of information
from many expert sources. We did not undertake such an investigation within the
scope of this initial task. To illustrate the safety methodology, we assigned differ-
ent flight tracks for runway approaches as the impact of system functional states.
In doing so, we achieved an association between the system functional state prob-
abilities of the Markov model and the operational safety metrics generated from
the interaction-response model. The specific details of the Impact Model pre-
sented in this illustration should not be taken as conf'mned, validated facts; they
are not! However, the objective of the Impact Model, which is to determine and
choose a flight track for runway approach that reflects a combined operational ca-
pability of the aircraft and pilot that is consistent with a given system functional
state, remains valid and important to the realistic evaluation of system safety.
Desired Capabilities for the Interaction-Response Model
Draper has continued to enhance the capabilities of the MIT Interaction-Response
Model. Our current model is completely symmetrized with respect to the capabil-
ity of ownship and othership. Either aircraft can be assigned any flight track, and
each aircraft has an alerting system and is capable of evasive maneuver. These
features are clearly desirable in order to realistically simulate the behavior of two
aircraft performing independent, parallel approaches. We have discovered some
interesting consequences of full-dual capability; these are described in Appendix
B and warrant future investigation.
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Appendix A
Reliability Model and Markov Analysis Information
This appendix lists the input files specifying the Markov Reliability Models to the Semi-
Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator (SURE) Reliability Analysis program. Table A-1
provides the mapping from the numerical states from each model to the operational
states for each function defined in Table A-1.
Table A-1. Reliability Model to Function State Mapping
Operational state of function Reliability model states
IAPR RNP navigation
Fully operational
Degraded
Failed safe
Failed uncovered
1,5,6,12
2,4,8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14
7
3
ADS-B/Surveillance data link
Fully operational
Degraded
Failed safe
Failed uncovered
Unknown (aggregate trapping state)
1,2,5,6,7,9
8,10
4
3
11
Collision alerting avionics
Fully operational 1,2, 4, 6
Failed safe 5
Failed uncovered 3
Guidance and control
Fully operational
Failed safe
Failed uncovered
Unknown (aggregate trapping state)
1,2,4,6,7,8,9, 10, 11
5
3
12
Human factors
Fully operational 1
Recoverable fault 2
Non-recoverable fault 3
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APR RNP NAVIGATION
(* IAPR RNP Navigation Reliability Model *)
(* Failure Rates (failures/hour) *)
l_g - 3.0e-5; (* GPS *)
1 i = 1.0e-4; (* INS *)
l_nd = 2.0e-5; (* Navigation Displays *)
l_np = 1.0e-5; (* Navigation Processor *)
(* Coverage Probabilities *)
c_g : 0.99; (* GPS *)
c_i : 0.99; (* INS *)
c_nd2 : 0.999; (* Navigation Displays, two on-line *)
c_nd = 0.99; (* Navigation Displays, one on-line *)
c_np2 : 0.99; (* Navigation Processor, two on-line *)
c_np = 0.95; (* Navigation Processor, one on-line *)
(* Transition Rates *)
1,2 = l_g*c_g;
1,3 : l_g*(l-c_g) + l_i*(l-c_i) + 2"I nd*(l-c_nd2) + 2*l_np*(l-c np2);
1,4 = l_i*c_i;
1,5 = 2*l_nd*c_nd2;
1,6 = 2*l_np*c_np2;
2,3 = l_i*(l-c_i) + 2*l_nd*(l-c_nd2) + 2*l_np*(l-c_np2);
2,7 = 1 i*c_i;
2,8 = 2*l_nd*c_nd2;
2,9 = 2*l_np*c_np2;
4,3 = l_g*(l-c_g) + 2*l_nd*(l-c_nd2) + 2*l_np*(l-c_np2);
4,7 = l_g*c_g;
4,10 : 2"i nd*c_nd2;
4,11 - 2*l_np*c_np2;
5,3 : l_g*(l-c_g) ÷ l_i*(l-c_i) + l_nd*(l-c_nd) + 2*l_np*(l-c_np2);
5,7 = l_nd*c_nd;
5,8 = l_g*c_g;
5,10 = l_i*c i;
5,12 = 2*l_np*c_np2;
6,3 = l_g*(l-c_g) + l_i*(l-c_i) + 2*l_nd*(l-c nd2) + l_np*(l-c np);
6,7 : l_np*c np;
6,9 = 1 g*c g;
6,11 = l_i*c i;
6,12 = 2"i nd*c_nd2;
8 3 = l_i*(l-c_i) + l_nd*(l-c_nd) + 2*l_np*(l-c_np2);
8 7 = l_i*c_i + l_nd*c_nd;
8 13 = 2*l_np*c_np2;
9,3 = l_i*(l-c i) + 2*l_nd*(l-c_nd2) + l_np*(l-c_np);
9,7 = l_i*c_i + l_np*c_np;
9,13 = 2*l_nd*c_nd2;
10,3 = l_g*(l-c_g) + l_nd*(l-c_nd) + 2*l_np*(l-c_np2);
10,7 = l_g*c_g + l_nd*c_nd;
10,14 = 2*l_np*c_np2;
11,3 = 1 g*(l-c_g) + 2*l_nd*(l-c nd2) + l_np*(l-c_np);
11,7 = l_g*c_g + l_np*c_np;
11,14 = 2*l_nd*c_nd2;
12,3 = l_g*(l-c_g) + l_i*(l-c_i) + l_nd*(l-c_nd) + l_np*(l-c_np);
12,7 = 1 nd*c nd + l_np*c_np;
12,13 = l_g*c_g;
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12,14 : l_i*c_i;
13,3 : 1 i*(l-c_i) + l_nd*(l-c_nd) + l_np*(l-c_np);
13,7 = 1 i*c_i + l_nd*c_nd + l_np*c_np;
14,3 - l_g*(l-c_g) + l_nd*(l-c_nd) + 1 np*(l-c np);
14,7 = i g*c_g + l_nd*c_nd + 1 np*c_np;
POINTS : ii;
start : i;
time : i0;
list : 3;
prune : le-100;
run nay.out;
ADS-B/SURVEILLANCE DATA LINK
(* ADS-B/Surveillance data Link Reliability Model *)
(* Failure Rates (failures/hour) *)
1 a : 1.0e-5; (* AHRS *)
l_g = 0.0e-6; (* GPS; Equal to zero to maintain independence of models *)
l_i = 0.0e-6; (* INS; Equal to zero to maintain independence of models *)
l_ad = 2.0e-5; (* ADS-B Displays *)
1 ap = 1.0e-5; (* ADS-B Processor *)
l_mt - 5.0e-5; (* Modulator and Transmitter *)
l_rd = 5.0e-5; (* Receiver and Demodulator *)
1 an = 1.0e-6; (* Antenna *)
(* Coverage Probabilities *)
c_a = 0.99;
c_g = 1.0;
c i = 1.0;
c_ad2 = 0.999;
c_ad = 0.99;
c_ap2 = 0.99;
cap = 0.95;
c mt = 0.99;
c rd - 0.99;
c_an = 1.0;
(* AHRS *)
(* GPS *)
(* INS *)
(* ADS-B Displays, two on-line *)
(* ADS-B Displays, one on-line *)
(* ADS-B Processor, two on-line *)
(* ADS-B Processor, one on-line *)
(* Modulator and Transmitter *)
(* Receiver and Demodulator *)
(* Antenna *)
(* Transition Rates *)
1,2 : l_a*c_a;
1,3 = l_a*(l-c a) + 1 g*(l-c_g) + 1 i*(l-c_i) + 2"i ad*(l-c ad2) +
l_ap*(l-c_ap2) + l_mt*(l-c_mt) + l_an*(l-c an);
1,4 = l_g*c_g + l_mt*c_mt + l_an*c_an;
1,5 = 1 i*c_i;
1,6 = 2"i ad*c_ad2;
1,7 = 2*l_ap*c_ap2;
i, 8 = 1 rd;
2,3 : l_g*(l-c_g) + l_i*(l-c i) + 2*l_ad*(l-c ad2) +
l_ap*(l-c_ap2) + l_mt*(l-c_mt) + 1 an*(l-c_an);
2,4 = l_g*c_g + l_i*c_i + l_mt*c_mt + l_an*c_an;
2,9 = 2*l_ad*c_ad2 + 2*l_ap*c_ap2;
2,10 = l_rd;
5,3 : l_a*(l-c_a) + l_g*(l-c_g) + 2*l_ad*(l-c ad2) +
1 ap*(l-c_ap2) + l_mt*(l-c mt) + 1 an* (1-c an) ;
5,4 = l_a*c_a + l_g*c_g + l_mt*c_mt + l_an*c_an;
5,9 = 2"i ad*c_ad2 + 2*l_ap*c ap2;
5,10 = l_rd;
6,3 : l_a*(l-c_a) + l_g*(l-c_g) + l_i*(l-c i) + l_ad*(l-c_ad) +
2*l_ap*(l-e_ap2) + l_mt*(l-e_mt) + l_an*(l-c_an);
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6,4 - l_g*c_g + l_ad*c_ad + l_mt*c_mt + l_an*c_an;
6,9 = l_a*c_a + i i*c i + 2*l_ap*c_ap2;
6,10 = l_rd;
7,3 = 1 a*(l-c a) + 1 g*(l-c_g) + l_i*(l-c i) + 2*l_ad*(l-c_ad2) +
l_ap*(l-c_ap) + 1 mt*(l-c_mt) + l_an*(l-c_an);
7,4 = l_g*c_g + l_ap*c_ap + l_mt*c_mt + 1 an*c_an;
7,9 = l_a*c_a + l_i*c_i + 2*l_ad*c_ad2;
7,10 = l_rd;
8,3 = l_a*(l-c_a) + l_g*(l-c_g) + l_i*(l-c_i) + 2*l_ad*(l-c_ad2) +
2"i ap*(l-c_ap2) + l_mt*(l-c_mt) + l_an*(l-c_an);
8,4 = l_g*c_g + l_mt*c_mt + l_an*c_an;
8,10 = l_a*c_a + l_i*c_i + 2*l_ad*c_ad2 + 2*l_ap*c_ap2;
9,11 = 1 a + l_g + 1 i + 2*l_ad + 2*l_ap + l_mt + l_rd + 1 an;
i0,ii = l_a + l_g + l_i + 2*l_ad + 2*l_ap + l_mt + l_rd + l_an;
POINTS - II;
start - i;
time : i0;
list = 3;
prune = le-lO0;
run sur.out;
COLLISION-ALERTING AVIONICS
(* Collision Alerting Avionics Reliability Model *)
(* Failure Rates (failures/hour) *)
l_nd : 2.0e-5;
l_np = l. Oe-5;
(* Alerting Displays *)
(* Alerting Processor *)
(* Coverage Probabilities *)
c_nd2 = 0.999; (* Alerting Displays, two on-line *)
c_nd = 0.99; (* Alerting Displays, one on-line *)
c_np2 = 0.99; (* Alerting Processor, two on-line *)
c_np = 0.95; (* Alerting Processor, one on-line *)
(* Transition Rates *)
1,2 : 2*l_nd*c_nd2;
1,3 = 2*l_nd*(l-c nd2) + 2*l_np*(l-c np2);
1,4 = 2*l_np*c np2;
2,3 = 1 nd*(l-c_nd) + 2*l_np*(l-c_np2);
2,5 : l_nd*c_nd;
2,6 = 2*l_np*c_np2;
4,3 : 2*l_nd*(l-c_nd) + 1 np*(l-c_np);
4,5 : l_np*c_np;
4,6 = 2*l_nd*c_nd2;
6,3 = l_nd*(l-c_nd) + l_np*(l-c_np);
6,5 : 1 nd*c nd + l_np*c_np;
POINTS = ll;
start = i;
time = 10;
list = 3;
prune = le-100;
run alert.out;
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GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
(* Guidance and Control Reliability Model *)
(* Failure Rates (failures/hour) *)
l_es : 4.0e-5; (* Engine Sensors *)
l_ep : 1.0e-5; (* Engine Processor *)
l_e = 1.0e-5; (* Engine *)
l_ap - 2.0e-5; (* Alternator and PDU *)
l_d = 2.0e-5; (* G & C Displays *)
l_as = 4.0e-5; (* Aircraft State and Environment Sensors *)
l_cp = 1.0e-5; (* Control Processor *)
l_cs : 5.0e-6; (* Control Surfaces *)
(* Coverage Probabilities *)
c_es2 : 0.99; (* Engine Sensors, two on-line *)
c_ep2 0.99; (* Engine Processor, two on-line *)
c_e = 0.999; (* Engine *)
cap = 0.99; (* Alternator and PDU *)
c d2 = 0.999; (* G & C Displays, two on-line *)
c_as2 = 0.99; (* Aircraft State and Environment Sensors, two on-line *)
c_cp2 = 0.99; (* Control Processor, two on-line *)
c cs2 = 0.99; (* Control Surfaces, two on-line *)
(* Transition Rates *)
1,2 : 2*l_es*c_es2;
1,3 : 2*l_es*(l-c_es2) + 2*l_ep*(l-c_ep2) + 2*l_e*(l-c e) + 2*l_ap*(l-c_ap) +
2*l_d*(l-c_d2) + 2*l_as*(l-c_as2) + 2"i cp*(l-c_cp2) + 2*l_cs*(l-c cs2);
1,4 : 2*l_ep*c_ep2;
1,5 = 2*l_e*c_e;
1,6 : 2*l_ap*c ap;
1,7 = 2*l_d*c_d2;
1,8 = 2*l_as*c_as2;
1 9 = 2*l_cp*c_cp2;
1 i0 = 2"i cs*c_cs2;
2 3 - l_es + 2*l_ep*(l-c_ep2) + 2*l_e*(l-c_e) + 2*l_ap*(l-c_ap) +
2*l_d*(l-c_d2) + 2"i as*(l-c as2) + 2"i cp*(l-c_cp2) + 2*l_cs*(l-c_cs2);
2,5 = 2*l_e*c_e;
2,11 = 2*l_ep*c ep2 + 2"i ap*c_ap +
2*l_d*c d2 + 2*l_as*c_as2 + 2*l_cp*c_cp2 + 2*l_cs*c_cs2;
4,3 : 2"i es*(l-c_es2) + l_ep + 2*l_e*(l-c e) + 2*l_ap*(l-c_ap) +
2*l_d*(l-c d2) + 2*l_as*(l-c_as2) + 2*l_cp*(l-c_cp2) + 2*l_cs*(l-c_cs2);
4,5 = 2*l_e*c_e;
4,11 - 2*l_es*c es2 + 2*l_ap*c_ap +
2*l_d*c_d2 + 2*l_as*c_as2 + 2*l_cp*c_cp2 + 2*l_cs*c_cs2;
6,3 = 2"i es*(l-c_es2) + 2*l_ep*(l-c_ep2) + l_e*(l-c_e) + l_e + l_ap +
2*l_d*(l-c_d2) + 2*l_as*(l-c as2) + 2"i cp*(l-c_cp2) + 2*l_cs*(l-c_cs2);
6,5 = l_e*c e;
6,11 = 2*l_es*c_es2 + 2*l_ep*c_ep2 +
2*l_d*c_d2 + 2*l_as*c_as2 + 2*l_cp*c_cp2 + 2*l_cs*c_cs2;
7,3 = 2*l_es*(l-c_es2) + 2*l_ep*(l-c ep2) + 2*l_e*(l-c_e) + 2*l_ap*(l-c_ap) +
l_d + 2*l_as*(l-c_as2) + 2"i cp*(l-c_cp2) + 2*l_cs*(l-c_cs2);
7,5 = 2*l_e*c_e;
7,11 : 2*l_es*c_es2 + 2*l_ep*c_ep2 + 2"I ap*c_ap +
2*l_as*c_as2 + 2*l_cp*c_cp2 + 2*l_cs*c_cs2;
8,3 = 2*l_es*(l-c_es2) + 2*l_ep*(l-c_ep2) + 2*l_e*(l-c_e) + 2"I ap*(l-c_ap) +
2*l_d*(l-c_d2) + l_as + 2*l_cp*(l-c_cp2) + 2*l_cs*(l-c_cs2);
8,5 : 2*l_e*c_e;
8,11 = 2*l_es*c_es2 + 2*l_ep*c_ep2 + 2*l_ap*c_ap +
2*l_d*c_d2 + 2*l_cp*c_cp2 + 2*l_cs*c_cs2;
9,3 : 2*l_es*(l-c_es2) + 2*l_ep*(l-c_ep2) + 2*l_e*(l-c_e) + 2*l_ap*(l-c_ap) +
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2*l_d*(l-c_d2) + 2*l_as*(l-c_as2) + l_cp + 2*l_cs*(l-c_cs2);
9,5 = 2*l_e*c_e;
9,11 = 2*l_es*c_es2 + 2*l_ep*c ep2 + 2*l_ap*c_ap +
2*l_d*c_d2 + 2*l_as*c_as2 + 2*l_cs*c_cs2;
10,3 = 2*l_es*(l-c_es2) + 2*l_ep*(l-c_ep2) + 2*l_e*(l-c_e) + 2*l_ap*(l-c_ap) +
2*l_d*(l-c_d2) + 2"i as*(l-c_as2) + 2"i cp*(l-c_cp2) + l_cs;
10,5 = 2*l_e*c_e;
i0,ii= 2*l_es*c_es2 + 2*l_ep*c_ep2 + 2*l_ap*c_ap +
2*l_d*c_d2 + 2*l_as*c_as2 + 2*l_cp*c_cp2;
11,12= 2*l_es + 2*l_ep + 2*l_e + 2*l_ap +
2*l_d + 2*l_as + 2*l_cp + 2*l_cs;
POINTS : ii;
start : I;
time : i0;
list = 3;
prune = le-100;
run g_and_c.out;
(* Human Factors Reliability Model *)
(* Failure Rates (failures/hour) *)
l_in 1.0e-4; (* Intermittent Human Failure *)
l_p - 1.0e-6; (* Permanent Human Failure *)
(* Recovery Rates (recoveries/hour) *)
r in = (1./10.)*(3600./1.); (* Recovery rate from Intermittent Human
Failure *)
(* Transition Rates *)
1,2 = l_in;
1,3 = l_p;
2,1 = r_in;
POINTS = ii;
start = i;
time = I0;
list = 3;
prune = le-100;
trunc = i00;
run human_2.out;
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Draper Enhanced and Modified Interaction-
Response Model
Draper has continued to enhance the capabilities of the MIT Interaction-Response
model. Our current model is completely symmetrized with respect to the capabil-
ity of ownship and othership. In fact, the "ships" are referred to as "lftship" (left
ship) and "rgtship" (right ship) to correspond with left and right parallel runways.
Either aircraft can be assigned any flight track, and each aircraft has an alerting
system and is capable of evasive maneuver. These features are clearly desirable to
realistically simulate the behavior of two aircraft performing independent, parallel
approaches.
The original MIT model did not allow any user adjustment to the simulation proc-
essing. We have created a user-friendly, front-end menu that offers the user the
following options:
Assign any single flight track to fftship and any single flight track to
rgtship for simulation run. The lftship is no longer restricted to "normal"
flight track. The code enhancement ensures that if a blunder track is se-
lected for the lftship, the lftship blunders toward the rgtship's runway. In
addition, the capability to select a single flight track for either or both
ships allows for much quicker, efficient testing during code development
and flight track generation.
Assign a customized file for flight tracks for either or both ships for the
simulation run. The user can create a file with any number of flight tracks
to be processed successively by the simulation. The resulting safety data is
output to a separate file and may be viewed at any time during the simula-
tion processing.
Adjust the alerting system's update frequency. This feature allows the user
to either speed up or slow down the rate at which the alerting logic is up-
dated with aircraft positional data. By exercising this option, the user can
test for safety sensitivity to the alerting logic update rate. Ideally, the
alerting logic should be updated at a rate that reduces false alarms without
penalty of increasing the probability of accidents.
Adjust the trajectory data of the flight track by inputting desired offset val-
ues. This feature allows the user to generate a new flight track from one of
the original eight Rockwell-Collins tracks.
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4, Simulate "bogus" information processing by a ship's alerting logic. For
example, the user specifies a flight track for lftship such as "fake_145,"
but specifies that "norm_145" be fed to rgtship's alerting logic thereby
simulating the situation that rgtship thinks lftship is on a normal approach.
Exercising this feature allows the user to investigate what happens when
misinformation is passed, such as could be the case with undetected or
transient failures in the system's navigational or surveillance processing.
Draper is continuing to test its version of the Interaction-Response model for a
variety of flight track combinations as well as alerting logics. With respect to at
least one alerting system, we have discovered a subset of scenario runs in which
missed detections occurred consistently. This subset consists of combinations of
"fake" and "oadj" flight tracks at different speeds. These results are preliminary
and warrant further investigation.
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Appendix D
Abbreviations
ADS-B = Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
AHRS = Attitude Heading Reference System
AILS = Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing
ATM = Air Traffic Management
CDTI = cockpit display of traffic information
DGPS = Differential Global Positioning System
FAA = Federal Aviation Administration
fmp = feet per minute
GPS = Global Positioning System
HITL = human in the loop
IAPR = independent approaches on parallel runways
IMC = instrument meteorological conditions
INS = Inertial Navigation System
MIT = Massachusetts Institute of Technology
PDU = power distribution units
PRM = Precision Runway Monitor
RNP = required navigation performance
TSE = total system error
VMC = visual meteorological conditions
SURE = Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator
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